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Abstract—Skip Graphs belong to the family of Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) structures that are utilized as routing overlays
in various peer-to-peer applications including blockchains, cloud
storage, and social networks. In a Skip Graph overlay, any
misbehavior of peers during the routing of a query compromises
the system functionality. Guard is the first authenticated search
mechanism for Skip Graphs, enables reliable search operation in
a fully decentralized manner. In this demo paper, we present a
proof-of-concept implementation of Guard on Skip Graph nodes
as well as a deployment demo scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a DHT-based overlay, Skip Graphs [1] provide efficient
routing functionality for peer-to-peer (P2P) systems includ-
ing distributed cloud storage [2], social networks [3], and
blockchains [4]. Each peer of a P2P system corresponds to
a Skip Graph node with a unique identifier. In a Skip Graph
with n nodes, each node needs to know only O(log n) other
nodes known as neighbors. Nodes benefit from their neighbor
list to locate each others (using their identifiers) in a fully
decentralized manner. That is, a search query gets handed
across a certain number of nodes that utilize their neighbor
list to forward the query closer to the destination. The entire
procedure has the message complexity of O(log n) [1], [5].
Search queries are the fundamental operation in Skip Graphs
that enable the nodes to join the overlay as well as to build up
complex cooperative P2P applications, e.g., P2P cloud storage.
The malicious nodes along a search path can jeopardize the
safety of the system by conducting routing attacks namely,
by dropping, manipulating, misdirecting or falsifying a search
query that they are intended to route. Skip Graphs do not
intrinsically preserve the correctness of routing in the pres-
ence of malicious actors. Besides, the applicable DHT-based
solutions on Skip Graphs either degrade its decentralization
[6], [7], [8], or increase its communication complexity [9].
To address the security of Skip Graphs against the men-
tioned routing attacks, we proposed Guard [10], which is the
first fully decentralized authenticated search mechanism for
Skip Graphs. In Guard, each of the nodes involved in the
routing of a search query generates and piggybacks a proof
to the search message that asserts the honest behavior of that
node. This enables both the search initiator as well as the
nodes on the search path to verify the validity of the search
result. In a Guard-enabled Skip Graph, no malicious node can
Fig. 1: The inter-node interactions in the layered software architecture of Guard. The
bottom-most solid horizontal arrow corresponds to a real path in the underlying
network, while the other dashed horizontal arrows indicate virtual pairwise
communications of the layers through the underlying network.
deliberately deviate from the search protocol without being
detected and caught by others.
In this demo paper, as the original contribution, we present
an open-source proof-of-concept implementation of our soft-
ware architecture and implementation of Guard (in Java) [11],
and its interaction with the Skip Graph nodes it operates on.
We also present the demo scenario of deploying our Guard
implementation in the production-level cloud computing en-
vironment of Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Compute Cloud
service (AWS EC2).
II. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
The layered software architecture of our proof-of-concept
implementation of Guard is depicted in Figure 1. In this figure,
the double-sided vertical arrows represent the internal interac-
tions among the layers of a node. Similarly, the horizontal
arrows show the interactions between levels of the same type
on two different nodes. The layers of a node from the top to
the bottom are called User Interface, Overlay, Authentication,
and Communication, respectively.
User Interface interacts with the user that runs the under-
lying peer (i.e., device) of the node. This layer receives the
control commands from the user, passes them to the Overlay
layer for process, and displays the obtained result from the
Overlay layer. The supported operations by the User Interface
layer are join and search. A join places the underlying peer as
a Skip Graph node with a unique identifier and address in the
decentralized Skip Graph overlay. A search returns the address
of the node that holds the closest identifier to the search target
[1], [5].
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Overlay layer implements a Skip Graph node, and provides
the User Interface with join and search operations. The join is
done by receiving a unique identifier for the target node. The
identifier of a peer is the hash value of its (IP) address. The
search enables the overlay layer of different nodes to search
for each others’ identifiers in a fully decentralized manner.
As the result of searching for a node’s identifier, the overlay
returns (IP) address of the node that holds the search result
according to the search protocol [1], [5].
Authentication layer is where the core operational logic of
Guard resides. It receives an overlay operation (i.e., join or
search), generates authentication metadata for it and passes it
to the underlying network through the Communication layer.
Also, it receives the authenticated messages that are meant
for the Overlay layer of the node to route or receive. Upon
receiving such messages, it verifies the authentication metadata
generated by the Guard instance on the intermediate nodes,
and passes the message up only if the authentication metadata
is validated correctly. Structuring the software of the node
in this way, both the overlay and user interface only receive
messages and results that are validated against the correct
execution of Skip Graph protocols on other nodes.
Communication provides direct node-to-node communi-
cation through the underlying network. The Communication
instance of each node is uniquely identified by an (IP) address
and port number. The Communication layer implements the
Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) [12] interface. This
enables Communication instance of one node to directly ex-
change messages with the Communication instance of another
node via Java RMI through the underlying network.
III. SAMPLE DEMO SCENARIO
public class Parameters {
// search queries conducted by each node
public static final int MESSAGE_COUNT = 1000;
// maximum delay between consecutive queries at
each node (seconds)
public static final int WAIT_TIME = 5;
// payload size of each message
public static final int MESSAGE_LENGTH = 300;
// address of simulation CONTROLLER
public static final string CONTROLLER = <address>;
// ...
}
Listing 1: A sample simulation schema of Guard
Configuration: In Guard, a simulation is configured by
setting the Parameters class of the nodes. Listing 1 shows
a sample simulation configuration of the Guard demo. Each
node initiates one search query for a random target within
the system (at most) every 5 seconds for a total of 1000
queries. Each query message contains 300 bytes of payload.
Note that payload of the messages is distinct than their routing
information overhead (routing information are generated based
on the path they are taking). To keep track of the simulation
state, we define a special process known as the CONTROLLER,
which is external to the Skip Graph overlay. There exists only
a single instance of a CONTROLLER node for a simulation
of Guard. CONTROLLER acts as a centralized point of trust
that synchronizes the overlay nodes with each other. Guard is
a fully decentralized protocol that operates on asynchronous
communication model [13] where there is no known bound
over the message transmission delay among the nodes. Nev-
ertheless, we found having a CONTROLLER a convenient
solution only to establish large scale implementation of its
proof-of-concept over cloud in a reliable manner, as well
as closely tracking the simulation performance. Address of
CONTROLLER is hardcoded in the Parameters class of
each node.
Initialization: Upon running up, each new node initiates
the decentralized Skip Graph join protocol [1]. This protocol
enables the node to interact with other nodes of the system
in a fully decentralized manner and build up the overlay
collaboratively. Once each node joins the overlay successfully,
it registers itself to the CONTROLLER. Once all nodes join the
system and the Skip Graph overlay is shaped completely, the
CONTROLLER starts the initialization phase of Guard [10] on
each node. During this phase, the Skip Graph nodes construct
the authentication metadata, which is later on frequently
utilized to authenticate the search queries they route. It is
worth noting that the original solution of Guard [10] assumes
no churn in the Skip Graph, i.e., once a Skip Graph node
initiates the join protocol, it remains available the entire time
and does not go offline or fail [14]. We will address handling
churn for Guard in our future works.
Experiments: Once the initialization is complete,
CONTROLLER broadcasts an experiment request message
to every node in the system. For the sake of demonstration
and to perform a fair comparison, each node performs
1000 pairs of searches during this time upon receiving an
experiment request message. The value 1000 corresponds
to the MESSAGE_COUNT field of the configuration file in
Listing 1. In each pair of searches, the node chooses a random
identifier uniformly as the search target. It then performs an
unauthenticated search followed by an authenticated one. As
there is no churn in the system, both searches follow the
same search path. Note that Guard has provable security in
the presence of malicious colluding adversaries aiming on
breaking the authenticity of search proofs [10]. This implies
that no probabilistic polynomial node on a search path can
deviate from the search protocol while successfully forging a
search proof that covers up for its deviation. Hence, at the
level of the proof-of-concept, having the searches in pairs
of authenticated and unauthenticated ones provides a fair
comparison of the time overhead that Guard applies to make
the searches authenticated. To avoid congestion, however,
each node waits between conducting every two consecutive
pairs of searches for a period that is uniformly drawn between
1 to 5 (i.e., WAIT_TIME). This phase is complete when every
node performs the assigned 1000 pairs of search queries and
receives their results.
Measurements: Once the Experiment phase is over,
Controller collects the log file of every node and merges
them into a single file. The individual log files of the nodes
contain all the details of every event that has happened in
their Initialization and Experiment phases. The log files are
in csv format, which allow to make any arbitrary query and
extract any parameter of interest, for example, the average
query latency, the average local computation time of a node
upon routing a message, and the average message size. All
measurements are done in both authenticated and unauthenti-
cated modes by filtering their corresponding logs.
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